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Abstract
This article proposes an institutional analysis of modern capitalist economies. It
argues that the institutional dimension is crucial if one wants to account for the co-
existence of different types of modern developed economies, characterised by
substantially different institutional structures. It explains why no generalised pattern
of convergence towards the same economic model should be expected, in spite of
‘globalisation’. An institutional analysis of modern economies, or social systems of
innovation and production, can be made using the concepts of complementarity and
hierarchy of institutions. Institutional arrangements are complementary to each other
and thus define the coherence as well as the potential for evolution of the various
economies. The hierarchy of institution expresses which part of the institutional
drives the others and is helpful for understanding historical evolutions. The paper
proposes a classification of developed economies and draws some conclusions
regarding the usefulness of the concepts of complementarity and hierarchy of
institutions for economic policy.
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Beitrag bietet eine Analyse der Institutionen moderner
kapitalistischer Volkswirtschaften. Der institutionellen Dimension wird entscheidende
Bedeutung beigemessen, wenn es darum geht, die Koexistenz verschiedener
kapitalistischer Wirtschaftsmodelle mit sehr unterschiedlichen institutionellen
Strukturen zu begründen. Es wird erläutert, warum trotz „Globalisierung„  kein
einheitliches Konvergenzmuster zu erwarten ist. Eine institutionelle Analyse
moderner Volkswirtschaften, zum Beispiel der sozialen Innovations- und
Produktionssysteme, kann mit Hilfe der Konzepte der Komplementarität und
Hierarchie von Institutionen erfolgen. Institutionelle Strukturen sind komplementär
und definieren somit die Kohärenz sowie das Entwicklungspotential der betreffenden
Volkswirtschaften. Die institutionelle Hierarchie beschreibt, welches Glied des
Institutionengefüges die anderen steuert, und trägt so zum Verständnis historischer
Entwicklungen bei. Der vorliegende Beitrag bietet eine Klassifizierung entwickelter
Volkswirtschaften und zieht einige Schlußfolgerungen im Hinblick auf die
Nützlichkeit der Begriffe Komplementarität und Hierarchie von Institutionen für die
Wirtschaftspolitik.
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11. Introduction
The importance of institutions in economics is more widely acknowledged nowadays
than it used to be, say 15 or 20 years ago. The idea that ‘institutions matter’ in
economics in general and particularly for growth and long-run development used to
be mainly put forward by ‘off-mainstream’ economists, but this is no longer true.1 The
roots of the previous situation could be found in the fact that mainstream economics
has its origins in the Walrasian project of an ‘économie pure’, for which the (active)
neglect of historical and institutional elements, i.e. particularities, is a prerequisite for
the establishment of economics as a genuine science, since science is only
concerned with generic patterns. The only ‘institution’ that finds its place in that
setting is the market, and only in a highly idealised form, with the existence of an
auctioneer, the absence of exchange until all excess demands are null, and all the
well-known hypotheses of General Equilibrium. By contrast, one may thus easily
understand why neo-classical economics has always regarded institutional
preoccupations with suspicion. To cut a long story short, one may state that
historical elements and institutional analyses were seen as best left to historians,
sociologists or political scientists since economists had to find out the workings of
economic mechanisms irrespective of time and place, they had to discover economic
laws.2
Still, the pretensions of pure economics have been downward adjusted and the
time has come (back) for the consideration of what Malinvaud [1996] calls
‘interpretative inference’ or what evolutionary economists3 call ‘appreciative theory’,
i.e. non-formalised assertions, which may be suggested by the study of economic
history. The historical and institutional context is therefore no longer deemed an
exotic topic for economists. Indeed, the more prominent role of institutions is blatant
when one looks at the current publications in economics journals. Modern
microeconomics is more concerned with second-best theory, market failures and
contracts than the restatement of the fundamental theorems of welfare. One may
argue that it is but a very tenuous link to institutional concerns in economics but it
remains that the supposedly institutions-free Walrasian-type equilibrium is no longer
the main focus of economic theory. New institutional economics is a typical
expression of the current interest for institutions, with an emphasis on micro-
foundations and a widening of the scope of traditional microeconomics. New
                                           
1 Douglas North, who has written extensively about the importance of institutions for economic
development was awarded the Nobel prize in 1993, jointly with Robert Fogel, ‘for having renewed
research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to
explain economic and institutional change’.
2
 For a much broader perspective on this topic, see Hodgson [1996].
3
 Particularly Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter.
2economic History is the application of that interest to the field of history. Evolutionary
economics is concerned with the emergence of institutions, notably through repeated
individual interaction. The same pattern applies to macroeconomics: the influence of
labour market institutions on the pattern of employment or the role played by a
independent central bank are two topics which exemplify the concern about the
importance of institutions.
One could use this example to show once again how mainstream economy
incorporates what it used to reject4 as soon as it is able to express it in its own
terms.5 But this sort of methodological debate is of drastically limited interest for what
matters here. This paper argues that, yes indeed, ‘institutions matter’, but saying this
is far from enough.
Once the importance of institutions has been admitted, another type question
appears, concerning what the institutional features of a capitalist economy should
be, since it appears that advanced capitalist economies are characterised by
different institutional features. Free-market proponents would insist that if yes indeed
institutions matter, they do so in the way that those institutions that promote the
dissemination of the market logic to the widest possible area within society are
beneficial, whereas institutions that hinder market mechanisms (in getting the prices
right) are detrimental to growth and welfare. The logical consequence this standpoint
is that there should exist one best way to organise the institutional structure of an
economy just as there exists one unique economic equilibrium. As a corollary, the
observation of diversity in the institutional features of advanced capitalist economies
is a bad omen, indicating that some countries have failed to adopt the ‘proper’
institutional structure, probably because some organised interest groups have a
vested interest in the current state of things. Going one step further, one may safely
recommend that a welfare-minded authority should see to it that the correct reforms
be initiated so that institutional convergence should set in.
Another line of thought does not consider institutional diversity that dramatically
and takes as a fact that that heterogeneity is a distinctive feature of modern
capitalism. This position is characteristic of Comparative Political Economy as well
as some institutionalist approaches to economics.6 A consequence is that one
should not expect a pattern of institutional convergence among developed
economies, or to put it in a different way, economic convergence in terms of GDP
per capita and technological level does not imply a strict convergence among
institutions or forms of organisation. But it may imply some loose convergence, or at
                                           
4
 There was a time where explanations regarding economic growth that went beyond discussions of
the Solow residual used to be considered as ‘bad sociology’.
5
 Amable, Boyer and Lordon [1995] have discussed how ‘methodological neo-classicism’ extends
the field of investigation of mainstream theory by keeping a few principles (optimisation, rational
agents,..) without necessarily clinging to the results of ‘fundamentalist neo-classicism’ (existence,
uniqueness and optimality of the decentralised equilibrium).
6
 See Hall [1999] for references. Crouch and Streeck [ 1996].
3least that if some institutions are not exactly replicated across advanced economies,
there exists functional equivalents. The main question concerns diversity and
similarity and one should then explain how markedly different institutional structures
can coexist and how they can evolve over time.
It is argued here that understanding the diversity of institutional structures, and
hence the diversity of capitalism, social systems of innovation and production or
whatever one wants to call them, implies to study how different institutions are
complementary to each other, in the sense that one institution functions all the better
that some other particular institutions or forms of organisation are present. This way
do institutions combine to define a coherent growth pattern. Such a perspective is
common to several institutionalist approaches,7 particularly those concerned with
long-run capitalist development as well as those which emphasise the existence of
several possible institutional architectures for modern capitalism.
The importance of institutions for growth will be emphasised in the following
section. This leads to the traditional conclusions that ‘institutions matter’, or at least
they may do so. Section 3 goes further by stressing that the consideration of single
institutions may be misleading and may altogether miss the genuine importance of
institutions in the economy, which is of a combinative nature. This section will
emphasise the importance of the complementarity among institutions as foundations
for institutional architectures which are characteristic of specific national models of
capitalism or epochs of capitalist development. Section 4 will present a few
institutionalist approaches and compare them from the point of view of the hierarchy
that they establish among institutions as well as the range of institutions that they
consider. Section 5 will present one particular approach, that of the Social system of
Innovation and production (SSIP). Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.
2. Do institutions ‘matter’?
One may start the investigation of the importance of institution in growth theory or
more generally economics with North [1990], where the approach is based on the
consideration of the microeconomic behaviour in the presence of institutions, and on
the consequences of micro decisions taken in a certain institutional context on macro
aggregates. Institutions are defined by North as ‘humanly devised constraints
imposed on human interaction’. They may thus be described as the rules of the
game(s) where individual agents are the players. Together with technology and
preferences -the two basic ingredients of microeconomics- they define the
constraints imposed on and the possibilities open to each agent. In such a setting, a
                                           
7
 Hall [1998], [1999] reviews some institutionalist approaches not mentioned here.
4link is provided between the role of history-dependent institutions8 and individual
behaviour since institutional arrangements define the incentive framework in which
agents take decisions. North further insists on the fact that institutions are generally
not optimal and provides an explanation why non-optimal institutions can still persist.
Growth-inhibiting institutions may not be replaced by more efficient arrangements in
backward or lagging countries because of the ‘fixed cost’ aspect of an institutional
architecture as well as its ‘increasing returns to adoption’ aspect. Institutions are
subject to the same phenomena as techniques: increasing returns to adoption and
hence the possibility of lock-in to inferior solutions.9 Inefficient institutions can
continue to exist because a sufficiently powerful coalition has an interest in their
existence, or because individual agents cannot co-ordinate their actions to change
them, etc. Applying this framework to long-run economic development, an
institutional basis for an explanation of non-converging growth trajectories would
then imply the elements described in Figure 1. As a consequence, a large variety of
institutions and organisations can influence the growth trajectories followed by
nations.
All this can be integrated in the new theories of endogenous growth. Table 1
lists the various sources of growth on which endogenous growth models can be built.
The nature of the growth factors considered in the different models implies the
presence of, mostly positive, external effects, at least in the vast majority of cases.
Institutions may play a role by inserting themselves between the decentralised,
institutions-free equilibrium, which is socially inefficient in the presence of
externalities, and the ideal reference, the social optimum, which correspond to the
internalisation of all external effects. The former equilibrium is assimilated to an
absence of institutions because agents react to market prices only, without any other
form of coordination being present. One may note that the characterisation of this
stylised, Walrasian, ‘market’ environment as the absence of institutions should not
be confused with the highly questionable assertion that markets as we know them
are not institutionally grounded. It is clear that exchange in markets as we know
them could not exist without a set of social institutions that organise it,10 but stylised
Walrasian markets only need an auctioneer to function adequately.
[figure 1 here]
Any type of ‘non-market’ arrangement influencing the accumulation of growth-
inducing factors is bound to have an effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium. In this
sense, institutions matter because they partly, and one may add imperfectly, solve
problems of coordination of agents’ plans, help promote cooperative behaviour and
                                           
8
 Institutions are ‘carriers of history’ in the words of Paul David [1994].
9
 Arthur [1994].
10
 The embeddedness of economic relationships in social ones is an important theme of sociology
(Granovetter [1985]). Evolutionary economics has insisted on the self-organisation mechanisms
that are at the foundations of ‘markets’ (Lesourne and Orléan [1998]).
5overcome opportunistic behaviour, make agents internalise externalities, whether
intertemporal or interpersonal, reduce uncertainty, etc. Thus, they contribute to
determining the macro outcome of individual agents’ actions. Some modes of
organisation and some institutional arrangements may be more or less effective in
having agents internalise external effects, in promoting co-operative behaviour or
facilitating co-ordination than others. Therefore, the characteristics of national
institutions, along with more strictly technological characteristics, will determine the
accumulation of physical capital, investment in R&D, the type of education of the
labour force,...and hence the growth path.
[table 1 here]
It is therefore possible to consider an institutionalist interpretation of the results
of endogenous growth models. Some papers have already made some steps
towards an institutional theory of growth and have shown the impact of:
- The type of financial intermediation system on growth: in Amable and Chatelain
[1995] a bank-based financial system favours long-term innovation projects
whereas a market-based financial system favour short-term projects; the impact
on the rate of growth depends on the relative productivity of the different projects.
If there exists many potentially productive long-term projects, a decentralised
financial intermediation system will lead to a slower growth rate than a more
concentrated financial system. In Amable, Chatelain and De Bandt [1998], a
concentrated banking system favours financial stability at the cost of higher
intermediation margins. On the opposite, a more competitive banking system has
lower intermediation margins, but is more prone to financial fragility. Since rational
investors and savers take into account the possibility of bankruptcy of the banking
system, the level of investment and savings may be higher with a concentrated
banking sector than with a more competitive sector in spite of higher
intermediation margins. The outcome may then be a faster growth rate.
- Labour markets characteristics on innovation or capital accumulation and growth:
in Palokangas [1996], wage bargaining conducted by trade-unions is favourable
to researchers’ wages, which incites skilled people to innovate and is in the end
favourable to growth; in Saint-Paul [1996], the level of firing costs influences the
pattern of international specialisation, from which one can derive that not too
flexible ‘European-type’ labour markets tend to induce producers to specialise in
mid-tech goods whereas an ‘Anglo-Saxon’-type of deregulated labour market
favours high tech production.
- The type of education system on growth and welfare. In Benabou [1996], inter-
personal and intertemporal externalities influence the individual accumulation of
human capital, along with education sector’s capital. The pattern of school funding
(locally or nationally) is going to have consequences on the pattern of human
capital accumulation in poor or reach areas and hence on the whole economy’s
growth rate.
6These are just a few examples of the incorporation of institutional
preoccupations in growth models. Table 1 suggests that several other possibilities
exist.11 It is also possible to make the growth-influencing institutional features
themselves endogenous, for instance by means of a political economy equilibrium.
An institutional architecture may be stable if validated by a political equilibrium
determined as a consequence of utility-maximising individual agents’ decisions
(Figure 2), or by a more sophisticated political theory.
[figure 2 here]
3. The interaction of institutions: institutional structures
Acknowledging the importance of institutions for economic decisions and outcomes
is not enough to build an institutional economic theory. A first and frequent
shortcoming is the failure to distinguish between different types of non-market12
means of coordination: conventions, organisations, institutions,… and to treat them
as belonging to the same class of ‘institutions’.13 Such a simplification is
understandable in modelling exercises such as the search for game-theoretical
bases of ‘institutions’,14 but game theory seems more apt to find bases for
conventions than institutions proper (See Table 2 for a tentative taxonomy), as
witnessed by the examples of ‘institutions’ given in Young [1998]: whether men or
women should propose first, whether men or women should give way to the other
when approaching a door, etc.15 One may argue that attempts to build institutions on
interacting individuals miss all the social constructs that mediate between the
individual and society and guide the former’s perception of the latter.16 Likewise,
contract theory may be helpful in the theoretical investigation of the organisation, but
one understands that the type of links between an individual and the constitution of
the country he/she lives in is very different from those resulting from, say, a labour
contract. In any case, conventions, organisations, institutions,…are different in their
principles, in the way they operate, in  the factors that influence their decay, etc.
Hence, a basic distinction of the different elements of an institutional economy is
useful in order to understand the dynamics of institutions. For instance,
                                           
11
 A large literature exists on the effects of taxation on growth.
12
 Once again, ‘non-market’ must be understood with reference to the Walrasian market of economic
theory.
13
 According to most dictionaries, an institution may be an organisation as well as a custom or a
practice or a formal rule. It is however necessary to distinguish between different meanings. The
minimal distinction is probably that between an organisation and an institution.
14
 Schotter [1981]. For a recent contribution in this field, see Young [1998].
15
 Young [1998] goes beyond the consideration of such social conventions and customs and
discusses the case of the adoption of a common medium of exchange, i.e. money; however, this
example looks somewhat contrived.
16
 For more on this topic, see Lordon [1999].
7organisations and institutions have different ‘selection principles’, to put it in
evolutionary terms, and lead to a variety of evolutionary processes;17 one may further
state that the conditions in which there exists a competition between organisations18
are hardly transferable to what could be interpreted as a competition between
institutions. The hierarchy that can be read in table 2 partly corresponds to other
distinctions found in the literature. North [1994] separates institutions (the rules and
the enforcement characteristics of these rules) from organisations (group of
individuals bound by a common purpose): organisations, like individuals are the
players of the game and institutions are the rules. Reynaud [1994] distinguishes
organisations from institutions and stresses that the former can only exist with the
support of the latter. Coriat and Weinstein [1999] have proposed to distinguish
between ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ institutions;19 the former integrate an explicit
enforcement dimension and express property rights, the latter concern private
arrangements between agents and are submitted to the rules defined by type 1
institutions. It is then understandable that it is possible to alter type 2  institutions
without changing institutions belonging to the first type. Hence, there exists a
difference in the dynamics of organisation and the dynamics of institutions, and
some differences within the class of institutions.
Another factor limits the scope of many approaches: the restriction of the
analysis to specific aspects of the economy. This is largely due to the difficulties of a
formal modelling involving a role for institutions. For analytical purposes, it is often
preferable to point out the influence of one particular institution in the economy than
to have to disentangle the joint effects of several of them. The contributions
mentioned in the previous sections concentrate on the impact of one institution on
the growth process for instance. There is however a risk attached to such an
approach. The necessary simplifications one has to make for theoretical
investigation on the importance of institutions may turn out to be major drawbacks
when the time comes for an empirical investigation. The (necessarily) simple links
analysed by theory will give clear-cut hypotheses which will then be directly tested
and will probably give disappointing results. The consequence of that may then to
emphasise the non-importance of institutions rather than how much they matter.20
                                           
17
 See also Nelson [1994] and [1995].
18
 Particularly profit-making organisations such as firms.
19
 This echoes a distinction proposed by Nelson [1994] for application to organisations.
20
 See for instance Sussman and Yafeh [1998]:
‘If institutions matter for country risk, interest rates should decline in response to the establishment
of institutions that protect property rights or establish the rule of law… […we found that…] the
establishment of modern, Western institutions (e.g. a central bank, a constitution), had no impact
on Japanese debt yields. The only events that significantly reduced the perceived risk associated
with Japanese bonds was the adoption of the Gold Standard in 1897. In addition, the war with
Russia (1904-5) affected yields in the short run, and improved Japan's debt capacity in the longer
run. We conclude that well understood monetary rules as well as military achievements matter
more for the perception of a country by foreign investors than modern state institution.
 ‘
However, one should not jump to the conclusion that ‘institutions do not matter’, since the Gold
Standard is an institution.
8After all, have not most European countries and Japan characterised by sensibly
different institutional architectures enjoyed roughly the same pattern of growth after
the second world war? If institutions mattered so much, one should have seen
divergent growth paths for these countries. In order to overcome this problem, it is
without doubt useful to allow for the possibility that different structures of institutions
may ‘perform’ roughly the same -in terms of an economy’s growth rate for instance-
in spite of having components which look very different compared to one another.
[table 2 here]
It seems therefore a ‘natural’ extension of the analysis to allow for the possibility
of interactions among several institutions and their joint influence on economic
outcomes. Just as one particular institution defines a set of constraints, possibilities
and incentives for individual agents, several institutions will define a set of
interrelated incentives which are going to jointly influence the individual agent’s
behaviour. This is akin to what North [1994] calls an ‘institution matrix’, a framework
of interconnected institutions that together make up the rules of the economy. It is
therefore logical to take into account the structure formed by several institutional
arrangements rather than isolated institutions, with the hypothesis that the
institutional structure defines the coherence of a ‘national model’, a historical phase
of development, a system of production, etc. To put it in a different way, the various
institutions, patterns of organisation, rules, norms, conventions,… of an economy are
not a more or less random collection of non-market arrangements. The presence of
a particular institution, in a particular form, may or may not be compatible with the
presence of another. The conditions for its existence and the relative efficiency of an
institution -according to economic criteria-  must then be determined by taking into
account a large set of institutional arrangement, not just one institution alone.
The basic hypothesis is therefore that, several institutions -in the broad sense-
taken together reinforce each other in a sense that will be made more explicit below,
so that they form a coherent and stable but not everlasting structure.21 Sticking to a
macro point of view, this structure shapes the growth trajectory or the general
features of an economy.22 The aggregate coherence given by a set of institutions is
defined by the complementary character of institutions.
The concept of complementary institutions is based on multilateral reinforcement
mechanisms between institutional arrangements: each one, by its existence, permits
                                           
21
 The theory of régulation in particular has been the target of attacks according to which it would
favour too much stability and reproduction and not enough instability and crisis. Such criticisms
would appear very odd to anybody with even a superficial knowledge of said theory considering
the number of times the word ‘crisis’ appears in régulationnistes book titles, but the argument still
crops up every now and then. In any case, a thorough answer is given in Lipietz [1988] and [1990],
and the topic is also treated in Amable and Lordon [1992]. Lordon [1997] even proposes a formal
treatment related to this question.
22
 See also Zysman [1994].
9or facilitates the existence of the others. Sticking to the static equilibrium defined by
a particular structure of institutions, the constraints and possibilities defined by a
given institution favour other institutions’ operation. Complementary institutions
make one another more or less efficient according to their respective characteristics.
This approach of complementary institutions is roughly that adopted by recent
papers that have studied how two institutions or forms of organisation interact to give
a coherent outcome: a non-accommodating central bank and centralised wage-
setting in Soskice and Iversen [1999], a main-bank-based financial system and a
team-based production organisation within the Japanese firm in Aoki [1994], etc.
Each institution or mode of organisation defines a set of constraints, incentives and
possibilities that determine agents’ strategies. The point is that the influence of one
institution is reinforced when the other complementary institution is present. The set
of incentives to the firm defined by the main bank makes team work all the more
efficient, etc. In other words, one institution, or one system if there is an isomorphism
between systems (finance, education, etc.) and institutions,23 functions all the more
efficiently when the other institution is present.
This complementary character is fundamental for defining the coherence as well
as the pattern of evolution of an economic system. The ‘coherence’ of a given
system -a ‘national’ model for instance, defined as the set of interrelated national
institutions- is then the expression of the complementarity between specific
institutional arrangements and the outcome in terms of economic performance
(growth, employment,…). What characterises the ‘German model’ for instance is not
only a handful of institutional characteristics inherited from history (a concentrated
banking system with a large influence on industry, a particular labour force training
system which gives highly qualified workers, strong labour unions and a centralised
wage setting, an independent Central Bank,…) but more importantly that these
characteristics are complementary to each other and have for consequence some
specific economic performance: a certain pattern of industrial specialisation, a
certain type of innovation, certain specific characteristics of the labour force in terms
of skills or adaptability, a structure of wage differentials, etc.
Another notion is a dynamic version of the former: a given set of institutions
reinforce each other over time, which explains the emergence of a particular
structure of institutions, or tend to weaken the coherence of the structure over time,
which explains why institutional structures, national models, systems of production,
modes of régulation… are not eternal. The static notion of complementary
institutions emphasises coherence and stability, the dynamic notion allows for the
emergence and disappearance of this coherence and leaves open the possibility of
structural breakdowns. The structure of institutions does not stay put over time and
each institution has its own, partly autonomous, dynamics too. More will be said
about this in the next section.
                                           
23
 This is mainly a methodological problem which corresponds to the level of analysis chosen.
10
One may just mention in passing a difference between destabilisation of a
structure and change taking place within a given structure, a difference understood
by reference to the macro-trajectory. If one takes the example of ‘national models’,
for instance France and Germany. One may oppose what would be a destabilisation
of the French model to changes within the German model. Destabilisation is a
breakdown in the pattern of institutional complementarity of a country. Change is a
modification of the forms taken by a basic complementarity which keeps on
operating with the same principles. The example could then be based on the
opposition between changes in the pattern of collective bargaining in Germany
which do not threaten the complementarity which founds the German model on the
one hand, and the destabilisation of the French model through the weakened role of
the State in the economy on the other hand. If one takes for granted that the
implication of the State in the economy is (was) the key to understanding what the
‘French model’ is, any evolution which makes Public intervention in the economy
increasingly difficult -e.g. the (in)famous globalisation and its constraints on Public
policies- is bound to destabilise the whole institutional structure on which the French
model is based, calling for further adjustments in other institutional arrangements
and a reinvention of the French model altogether.
At another level, considering complementary institutions instead of isolated
institutions has consequences for both empirical work and economic policy.
Regarding the former, the task devolved to  empirical institutional analysis is made
more arduous. It will not suffice to test for the positive impact of one particular
institution or form of organisation on some economic performance indicator, growth
or employment. Since institutions work in complementarity to each other, it will be
necessary to check the positive impact of several interrelated institutional
arrangements, the consequence being that the same institution or form of
organisation present at the same time in different countries may well produce very
different outcome depending on the national institutional contexts, i.e. the presence
or absence of other, complementary, institutions. Even identifying the set of
institutions that complement each other and on what terms they do so may not be a
simple task.
The consequence in terms of economic policy is to preclude any sort of
‘institutional tinkering’ that politicians may have in mind when they mention the
absolute necessity of reforming a specific area of the economic system. Changing
one element of the system may have consequences well beyond the element
concerned and threaten a certain pattern of complementarity. The effects of financial
liberalisation may not just be a drop in the intermediation margin and a cheaper cost
of capital as -one assumes- is intended. It may have effects on the monitoring of
projects by financial intermediaries, on the time horizon of investors, etc. Long-term
employment contracts are not just an impediment to labour market flexibility, they
also play a role in defining incentives for the accumulation of skills at the individual
level, without mentioning the positive effects of security on a societal level;
consequently, the introduction of more ‘labour flexibility’ (i.e. job insecurity) may
endanger the mode of skills formation which supports the production regime of a
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particular country. Once again, it is necessary to have the whole institutional picture
in mind before attempting some reform with an improvement of economic
performance in mind.24
4. Hierarchy of institutions and a tentative taxonomy of institutional
analyses
In order to complete the picture of the institutional structure which governs the
economy, one may wish to associate another notion to complementary institutions:
that of a hierarchy among institutions.25 The notion of complementarity links together
different institutions and modes of organisation in a certain architecture and focuses
on the positive interactions between the different elements, interactions which
condition the coherence -the intensity of the positive interactions and the overall
performance of the system- of the whole. The notion of a hierarchy among
institutions insists on the relative importance of one or a few institutions for the
coherence and dynamics of the institutional architecture as such. Just as there are
static and dynamic notions of complementarity, one may conceive a twin-definition of
the hierarchy of institutions. In its static version, hierarchy would be that the inner
design of one institution takes into account the constraints and incentives associated
to another one. It is thus an extension of the notion of complementarity, except that
one institution somehow imposes the conditions according to which complementary
institutions are going to supplement it in a certain institutional structure. The
circumstances in which such a hierarchy may appear depend on history. The
dynamic aspect of institutional hierarchy would be that the transformation of one
institution affects the evolution of another one. Both static and dynamic aspects are
linked insofar as one institution can destabilise the coherence of a whole
architecture by threatening the positive complementarities between institutions.
The hierarchy of institutions is closely linked to the institutional theory
concerned (see Table 3). One may distinguish three different types of institutional
approaches. The first type is what Amable and Petit [1999] have characterised as
‘general purpose institutional approaches’. They link the whole institutional
architecture of an economy to its main economic characteristics in order to account
for the long-run evolution of various modes of production. The institutions
considered cover a large area, beyond strictly economic activity. The second type of
institutional approach is more sectoral, centred on a specific area of the economy
                                           
24
 See also Boyer [1995] for a similar argument.
25
 Screpanti [1999] deals with ‘dominating’ institutions, defined as those which govern the highest
number of transactions in an economic system. Several types of capitalism may exist according to
the way property rights are defined and the type of accumulation governance structures. The
hierarchy of institutions thus defined considers the employment relationship as ‘the most important
relational contract in a capitalist mode of production’.
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and expanding its consideration of the institutional structure from its central focus,
the breadth of the expansion varying according to the authors. An example of such
an approach is that of national systems of innovation (NSI). One may further
distinguish between narrow and broad definitions of NSI as put forward by Lundvall.
The former limits itself to the areas of science, research, technology and in some
cases education. The latter extends to all economic structures and institutional set-
up affecting the production system and innovation. The third approach, to which the
‘varieties of capitalism’ and the ‘social systems of innovation and production’ belong,
is somehow intermediate between the former two, more restrictive in the set of
institutions considered than the general purpose approach but sharing the same
ambition to analyse whole production systems, less focused to the analysis of a
specific area than sectoral approaches such as the NSI.
4.1. General-purpose approaches
The vintage ‘régulation’ and SSA approaches are two examples of general-
purpose institutional approaches. The former is based on the consideration of five
‘institutional forms’: the wage-labour nexus, the forms of competition, international
relations, money, public authorities. The relations between these five forms
characterise the overall mode of régulation of the economy. The latter is more
country-specific, befitting the case of the US economy, and it may be argued that it is
more  period-specific as well, tied in its structure to the institutional context of the
pre-1970s with a special attention given to the pressure put on workers in the labour
market.
The idea of hierarchy among institutions is most present in general purpose
approaches, but can also be found in the other works discussed below. Regarding
general-purpose approaches, one can take the case of the vintage école de la
régulation; its aim was to explain the post-war ‘Fordist’ golden age as the
conjunction of five particular institutional forms. The post-war growth regime was
centred around one of the five institutional form: the wage-labour nexus, which then
had a predominant position in the hierarchy of institutional forms.
The necessities of a parallel evolution of mass consumption and mass
production for the coherence of Fordism put the institutional arrangements of the
wage-labour nexus at the centre of the whole institutional architecture. It permeated
the whole economic system via a new style for State intervention, a certain form of
oligopolistic competition, a particular credit regime and a stable international regime.
The capital/labour compromise allowed the implementation of Taylorist methods in
the factories in exchange for a certain sharing of the productivity gains thus
obtained, a certain degree of employment stability, and the social protection offered
by the welfare state. This led to a coordinated expansion of supply and demand and
a moderate competition between national producers, best characterised as an
oligopolistic behaviour. Inflationary pressures which may result are dealt with an
13
international regime that permitted discrete currency adjustments, and an
accommodating monetary policy. Short term demand management policies help in
stabilising economic dynamics.
[Table 3 here]
Expressed this way, vintage régulation of the late 1970s left little room for
possible diversity among developed economies, being more concerned with finding
a generic pattern that would fit all advanced capitalist countries for a given historical
period. The Fordist mode of régulation was meant to apply to all or most developed
countries, which adopted the same institutions and forms of organisation, more or
less following the American pattern. The consideration of national models, the
possibility for differentiated models of Fordism, will come later, with Boyer and
Mistral [1986], when further theoretical research as well as empirical evidence will
have shown that not only did advanced capitalist countries react to the crisis of the
1970s in different ways, but also they had adopted their own brands of Fordism
during the golden age, quite different from the original American pattern in most
cases. But in spite of its inclusion of diversity of capitalism, the theory of régulation
still kept searching for a new unified mode of régulation in some seemingly
successful national models afterwards, as an equivalent of the United States for the
Golden Age. Hence the quest for the awkwardly-named ‘post-Fordism’
unsuccessfully led régulationnistes researchers to Japan26 until it seemed once
again that the United States may have the keys to the new mode of régulation.
Whereas the Fordist mode of régulation was organised around the wage-labour
nexus, a new hierarchy characterises ‘tomorrow’s capitalism’; Aglietta [1998] coined
the term régulation patrimoniale for this new mode of régulation. In this case again, it
looks as if the United States gives the general pattern, as it did before with Fordism,
and the possibilities for diversity of capitalism in a regime of régulation patrimoniale
are not investigated yet.
The structural transformations of the past 20 years are interpreted as a reversal
of the hierarchy among institutional forms. One proposition (Amable and Petit [1995],
[1996], [1998], Petit [1998]) was that the forms of competition, i.e. the complex of
institutions and organisations that concern competition on the product market(s) and,
one may add, between financial intermediaries, are now the driving institutional form.
It means that the new constraints imposed by the relatively autonomous evolution of
the institutions and organisations pertaining to the ‘forms of competition’ realm are
not compatible with the ancient arrangements in other areas (wage-labour nexus,…)
and (a) threaten the coherence of the whole system (the Fordist mode of régulation)
and (b) impose a particular type of coherence for the new mode of régulation.
Giving all the aspects concerning these transformations is well beyond the limits
of this paper, but one can give a few indications:
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 See for instance Boyer and Durand [1997].
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 The deregulation of the financial systems favours market-based systems
(Anglo-Saxon countries) and threatens the stability of bank-based systems
(Germany and Japan). This has implications for the pattern of financing of
firms, and hence investment projects’ monitoring, as well as providing
opportunities for private savings. A new type of complementarity between
the new features of financial systems and other systems (industry,
innovation, labour relations,…) will have to be found.
 New opportunities for internationalisation of production give firms (large
ones at least) the possibility of escaping from the constraints given by a
particular national institutional system. This has destabilising effects for the
wage-labour nexus.
 New forms of employment emerge from the demise of the Fordist wage-
labour nexus and the diversity of the new employment relationships takes
over the homogeneity characteristic of the Fordist period.
 Individual income is more dependent on non-wage sources and
consumption is more sensitive to wealth effects.
 
Such an analysis allows for the consideration of a dynamics of institutions but is
subject to a certain number of drawbacks. The main one concerns the use of the five
institutional forms referred to above. These categories are too large to rule out a
certain vagueness in the institutions taken into account. The institutions liable to
enter into each category are many and the partition of institutions made according to
the institutional forms is somewhat fuzzy. For instance, does the institutions that
constitute the financial system pertain to the institutional forms ‘Money’, Forms of
competition’ or ‘International regime’? The difficulty of coming with an answer is
illustrated with how the reversal of hierarchy characteristic of the current period is
interpreted. The basic ingredients are the emergence of new types of competition on
the product markets and an increasing importance of differentiation and innovation,
financial liberalisation, increased capital mobility and a new pattern of corporate
governance, the growing influence of financial markets’ opinion on the definition of
economic policy, etc. These elements can be integrated in a scheme which may
alternatively locate at the top of the hierarchy the forms of competition (Amable and
Petit [1995]), Money (Aglietta [1998]) or the international regime (Boyer [1999]).
There is a difficulty in identifying the hierarchy of institutions and in the lack of
precision of the partition of institutions made with the five institutional forms of the
vintage régulation. For the sake of analytical precision, it may be useful to go beyond
this partition and investigate the institutions of forms of organisation within different
areas of economic activity.
 4.2 Intermediate institutional approaches
 
This is what the Social system of production approach does for instance (Table 3).
The range of activities taken into account by this approach is potentially very high
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and may come close to that of general purpose approaches. However, there seems
to lack a certain theory behind the choice of areas, once one wants to go beyond the
obvious (industrial relations, training, financial markets…) and reach areas more
distant from the usual focus of economics (fairness,…). In fact, it looks as if one had
no analytical approach on how to partition institutions outside the traditional
economic activities, which explain why the last categories taken into account by the
social system of production approach is more a ‘residual’ than anything else:
customs, traditions, norms, moral principles, rules, laws… This category mixes very
formal rules (the laws) with a mix of informal characteristics which may or may not be
the concern of economics. One feels that a national model for instance could be
interpreted within this approach by using first the factors of differentiation which are
more or less traditional in an institutional economics perspective and then resort to
making use of the less traditional elements to explain the ‘residual’, i.e. what is left
unexplained by the former factors. One may then build ex-post a complementarity of
institutions (and even a hierarchy) by adjusting some neo-Weberian elements to an
institutional economics analysis. The fear is great to see the appearance of the
notion of ‘culture’ -i.e. what is left once economists (or sociologists, or political
scientists,…) have run out of explanations-, drafted in to make the necessary
adjustments of the facts to the inevitably imperfect economic theory (or sociology,
etc.). The National System of Innovation approach is not immune to this, in spite of
an initially more focused topic.
 
The ‘variety of capitalism’ and ‘comparative institutional analysis’ approaches
avoid this problem by being more analytical in their understanding of the
complementarity between institutions and more restrained ex-ante in the coverage of
activities. Complementary institutions are derived from economic analysis
(sometimes using formal models) and there is a tight relationship between the
analysis of complementarity and the areas of the economy which are investigated.
The same approach and the same type of relationship between the areas and the
theory characterises also the Social system of innovation and production approach.
But this latter approach is distinguished from the former two by several aspects. First
the CIA approach seems a characterisation of capitalism inferred from the Japanese
case, in comparison with American capitalism. This is reflected both in the analytical
tools and the main institutions and forms of organisation analysed. By contrast, the
SSIP approach aims at analysing a large variety of developed capitalist economies.
Second, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach seems centred on the firm and its
relations with its environment and other firms. The SSIP approach is more
macroeconomic in its analysis. Much is attributed to organised business in the
‘variety of capitalism’ approach, which somehow derives from the ‘German’ origins of
the theory and the opposition between business-Coordinated Market Economies
(CMEs), i.e. Germany, Japan, etc., on the one side, and liberal market economies
(LMEs), i.e. the US, UK, etc., on the other side. This may account for the difficulty of
this approach to treat the cases of France or Italy, which do not clearly belong to
either type. Third, the SSIP approach is more systematically empirical than either the
CIA or ‘varieties of capitalism’ schools.
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5. A variety of Social Systems of Innovation and Production
 
The research on Social Systems of Innovation or on Social Systems of Innovation
and Production27 is an application of the approach in terms of complementary
institutions and tries to overcome several perceived weaknesses of the National
Systems of Innovation28 (NSI) approach:
 
 Most of the studies of NSI are made on one country at a time. When one
concentrates on national case studies, it is tempting to have as many
configurations as countries. What one can gain in precision is lost in the
generality of the principles.
 Even when attempts at international comparison are made, they concern
partial sub-systems and never the whole national system.
 At a time when the internationalisation of research is becoming more
widespread, when diffusion of new techniques and modes of organisation
is becoming more rapid, it may be an exaggeration to maintain the strictly
national nature of learning mechanisms. It seems preferable to consider the
notion of Social Systems of Innovation (SSI), which leaves open the
question of the territory over which the cumulativeness of the interrelations
and the coherence of the system operate.
 
The results of this approach can be summarised as in Table 5. The analysis
distinguishes four idealised models of social systems of innovation and production,
each one having its distinctive pattern of institutional complementarity and hierarchy.
For instance, Figure 3 gives a possible representation of the market-based SSIP.
Based on an empirical analysis, one may distribute a set of 12 developed capitalist
countries according to this classification. Although they are systems of innovation
and production, the role of technical change should not be overemphasised. There is
no simple technological determinism, no straight and direct link between science and
economic performance. Macro-level institutions that organise the innovation and
production process are determinant, there is no ‘natural’ configuration according to
which the relationships between science, technology and the economy should be
organised.
 
The logic behind the four models could be briefly summarised as follows (see
figure 3).
 
 
[figure 3 here]
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 Amable Barré and Boyer [1997a] and [1997b].
 
28
 Lundvall [1992], Nelson [1993],…
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5.1. The market-based SSIP
One finds on one end of the spectrum a market-based logic, held to govern almost
all social and economic activities, which is not contradictory with a sometimes heavy
involvement of the State in some particular areas, such as defence-related activities.
Advances in fundamental science are the result of competition between laboratories,
and the patent race decides of the R&D strategies of private firms. A strict definition
of property rights and their enforcement by a very developed legal system form two
of the pillars of such a SSIP. Sophisticated financial markets allow to mobilise
venture capital and give new sectors an opportunity to emerge. Very flexible labour
markets do not in general allow skill accumulation within the firm, in a context where
vocational training does not develop for lack of market-driven incentives. On the
other hand, labour movements between firms favour the dynamism of new firms. This
configuration comes close to the representation of LMEs in D. Soskice’s
classification.29
 
5.2. The social-democratic SSIP
At the other end of the spectrum, one may find a model based on compromise and
negotiation between the involved parties. Most of the forms of organisation have
their origins in the confrontation of the respective objectives of firms, salaried
workers and the State. These parties seek to come to an agreement on principles
liable to guarantee simultaneously firms' competitiveness and the reduction of
inequality. In this sense, this model may be called 'social-democrat'. The egalitarian
objectives in terms of income and education prevent the polarisation of skills and
induces pressures in favour of high value added sectors. This permanent adaptation
process presumes the existence of Public institutions whose purpose is to retrain the
labour force rejected by non-competitive sectors. Relatively underdeveloped
financial markets do not prevent the pursuit of long term objectives in the field of
innovation. In this model, one can see most clearly the construction of an SSI that
has little to do with a market-based logic. This model corresponds to the Centralised-
Egalitarian (CE) model of Soskice [1999].
 
5.3. The meso-corporatist SSIP
A third configuration can be called meso-corporatist, producing to some extent the
same results as the social-democrat model, but according to a different logic and
with the help of a different set of institutions. Large firms, linked through financial,
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 Soskice [1999].
18
personal or technological networks, are at the centre of the process of innovation.
Public schooling institutions limit themselves to the general education of a large
number of students while universities do a certain amount of basic research.
However, most of the innovations derive from the acquisition of competence within
the firm, according to a learning process that enables a growing sophistication of
products, processes and forms of organisation. The control that the main bank has
on an industrial firm permits long term horizons. In this model, innovation is mostly
governed by the search for products liable to satisfy the private demand, all the more
so that the small size of military expenditures and public programmes based on
incentives rather than rulings make competitiveness a major imperative of this SSI.
 
5.4. The public SSIP
A public-institutions-based model defines the last configuration in which public
institutions play a determining role in the impulse, codification and direction of
innovation and are at the centre of the processes of economic adjustment. In
opposition to the social-democratic configuration, tripartite bargaining is more
difficult and a large part of the specialisation derives from demand originating in
public expenditures: transport and communication infrastructures, health, etc. as well
as large public programmes, either civilian or military. Basic research is mainly
public, as is the education system, so that the transferability to the private sector of
research advances and the closeness of fit between training and the needs of
private firms may be a problem. Traditionally, public regulations have a role in the
allocation of credit by banks. This bank-based credit system tends to favour large
firms over small businesses and new firms. In this model, public authorities are an
important actor in the dynamic matching of supply and demand in the fields of
innovation, production and credit.
The above considerations are necessarily schematic and sum up very abruptly a
very complex set of interrelations between economic structures and institutional
forms, but what it suggests is that the four models are not variants of one unique
pattern, each has an internal logic and synergetic effects that are entirely specific.
 
As always with stylised models, the adequacy between the model and actual
countries is at best partial. One may have reservations when it comes to assigning a
particular country to one particular model. There is no doubt that the US and the UK
belong to the market-based model, and the size of public (defence) spending on
R&D in the U.S. is not relevant here as it has been shown before that the particular
U.S. market-based model actually involves a peculiar involvement of public
authorities.30 France is the figurehead of the public SSIP and Japan is the meso-
corporatist SSIP. However, one may be more cautious with Germany: the
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Sozialmarktwirtschaft is, in a certain way, close to the social-democratic model, with
the importance of bargaining, and close to the public model according to other
characteristics. A more refined classification would probably identify some elements
of the CME model within the Public SSIP. More generally, the public SSIP is that of
Continental Europe, of the founding countries of the EEC turned European Union.
 
Broadly speaking, each institutional setting expresses a set of objectives which
are implicitly or explicitly favoured :
 
 The market led model puts a strong emphasis upon the need for quick
adjustments to an uncertain environment, at the possible cost of dynamic
efficiency. Similarly the enforcement of property rights is perceived as
much more important that social justice and the implementation of a
complete welfare system.
 By contrast, the social democrat-model puts forward the objectives of social
justice and universal welfare and tries to organise collectively all the
adjustments required by innovation and technical change.
 The meso-corporatist model is another alternative to the market led system
: the common interest of permanent workers of the large company is
perceived as more important than the enforcement of property rights by
shareholders. Therefore, dynamic efficiency is privileged against static
efficiency, whereas most of the welfare is linked to each large company.
 The public model is also different, since State interventions are highly
developed  within any sector of economic activity : the implicit objective is
to alleviate a recurring social conflicts between groups and simultaneously
the legitimacy of public authorities is closely related to the monitoring of a
successful growth regime.
Thus it is not a surprise to observe that each model exhibits different patterns of
evolution in terms of scientific specialisation, innovation, factors of competitiveness
and therefore growth and employment patterns. Even though they belong to the
same economic zone, the countries which follow different models  have different
trajectories, at least until the early 1990s.31 But since then, some structural
transformations have taken places, each SSIP having its own autonomous dynamics
(See Table 6 for a brief summary of the dynamic forces within each SSIP). For
instance, the Scandinavian countries belong clearly to the social-democratic
trajectory, but their recent evolution has made their macroeconomic performances
become more similar to the rest of Europe, notably in terms of unemployment.
Similarly, the size of the country and the precise policy followed for a decade may
explain differences in performances among countries which belongs to the same
broad SSIP. In this respect, the pattern of restrictive macroeconomic policy followed
by European countries across most of the 1990s has certainly played a major role.
The trajectory followed by the Netherlands is quite original since the reforms in
labour market institutions as well as new trends for innovation policy have promoted
                                           
31
 For a full analysis of the 1990s see  Amable, Barré and Boyer  [1997a : 265-312].
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a clear decline in unemployment, contrary to what is observed elsewhere in
continental Europe. Conversely, France and Germany which belong to the same
broad model but experienced significant institutional differences, tend to converge in
terms of the reforms implied by the adhesion to the EURO. Japan seems to be
plagued by both structural and short-term macroeconomic problems. The former are
linked to the difficulty of the transition from a catch-up economy to a world
technological leader.32
[tables 4 and 5 here]
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented an institutionalist approach to the analysis of modern
capitalist economies based on the notion of institutional complementarity. This
notion is at the core of most analyses that try to identify coherent national models,
systems of innovation and/or production, varieties of capitalism or modes of
régulation to name but a few. These approaches treat their respective objects
(countries, systems, models, regimes,…) as not just a more or less random
collection of institutions, organisational forms, conventions, etc., but stress that the
pattern of interrelationship between the different elements of the institutional
structure defines the coherence of this structure. Some authors emphasise historical
transformations and isolate phases that are common to the advanced capitalist
countries, while others stress the differences between capitalist countries within a
given phase. Some works are more focused on a particular area within the economy
while others consider more extensive sets of institutions.
Putting the emphasis on institutional complementarity has consequences for
theoretical research, empirical work and policy recommendations. To put it shortly, it
is more important to study the effects of interacting institutions or organisations than
just admit that ‘institutions matter’. Empirically, one would expect that the pattern of
activity specialisation of a country (industry and services, industrial sectors, etc.)33
matches with a certain type of institutional or organisational configuration. Last, any
policy recommendation in the realm of ‘structural reform’ should take into account
the coherence and logic of the whole institutional structure.
Regarding the issue of an hypothetical convergence of countries towards the
same institutional model -and most analyses consider convergence towards the
market-based model, or LME in the variety of capitalism approach-, several elements
may be mentioned. The theoretical elements as well as empirical evidence point
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 See Casper [1998], [1999] for the case of bio-technology.
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towards both directions of convergence and divergence.34 If there is a tight
connection between the institutional structure and international specialisation, as
most institutionalist analyses would conclude, a simple argument in terms of gains of
international trade should militate in favour of the preservation of institutional
diversity across countries. If some types of productions find a more favourable
environment in a certain type of institutional structure, economic efficiency would not
recommend that all countries converge to the same institutional pattern.
Another aspects concerns technology. Here again, both theory and empirical
data do not point towards the uniformity of developed economies. The once popular
view concerning ‘global technology’ has long been identified as a myth.
Technological competence is for a large part developed locally, tacitly and
cumulatively, and the research on NSI has shown that national particularities in
science and technology systems are congruent to technological and industrial
specialisation. Besides, the analysis of the golden age would show that the same
Fordist technologies had been adapted nationally rather than merely adopted.
On the other hand, some trends are observable that push all advanced countries
in the same direction, that of financial liberalisation and increased capital mobility.
Regarding the latter, it is not that obvious that the internationalisation of investment
conducted by multi-national corporations (MNCs) should necessarily endanger some
institutional complementarities and direct all countries towards the market-based
system. On the one hand, capital mobility may initiate a race to the bottom in terms
of social protection, labour rights, wage levels, taxation rates and thus public
investment… and hence threaten the stability of countries that do not follow the
market-based pattern. Such a possibility already exists within the European Union
and the UK plays a special role in the competition between varieties of capitalism.
On the other hand, the argument in terms of the congruence between an institutional
structure and competence for certain types of production may prevail. In this case
the strategies of MNCs would be to exploit the opportunities provided by different
institutional structures and would thus have an interest in their preservation rather
than precipitating their disappearance.35 The strength of this last point rests
ultimately on the strengths of the linkages between institutions and competence in
production. Technology may modify this link, and extend the possibilities for
relocating for instance German-type differentiated quality production in lower-wages
countries, thus threatening the existence of the German model.
Financial liberalisation is not limited to FDIs. The dominant trend is the
extension of market finance at the expense of bank-based finance. Considering the
role played by banks in providing long-term ‘patient’ capital in some countries and
the inherent trend towards short-termism of market-based finance, this means
radical change for countries with a strong bank-based financial system (Germany,
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 See also Whitley [1998] on the topic of internationalisation and business systems.
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 See Ruigrok and van Tulder [1994].
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Japan,…), unless institutional innovation provides a functional equivalent to what
banks usually do in these countries. In any case, the rise of corporate governance
will imply a reshaping of the institutional complementarities.
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Figure 1 : Why do institutions shape the growth regime.
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Figure 3: A stylised representation of institutional complementarity
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Table 1. Institutions and organisations influence endogenous growth.
Source of
growth
Externalities or coordination problems
involved
Influential institutions and
organisation forms
economic policy instruments
Physical
capital
Positive externalities linked to capital
accumulation, through learning by doing or
because new knowledge is embodied in new
equipment (except in the simplest ‘A.K’
model where there are no external effects)
 financial intermediation system
 firms (mode of organisation,
strategies, time horizon,...)
 State
 taxes and subsidies to promote investment
 adequate policy mix and macroeconomic stability
Human capital Positive externalities through inter-personal
(having educated people around makes one
more productive) or inter-temporal effects
(learning now makes further learning easier)
 general education & training system
(public or private)
 technical education system
 firms’ internal training systems
 more generally the wage-labour
nexus
 education and training systems reform
 subsidies to education and training
 regulation on diplomas
innovation Positive externalities linked to the
accumulation of knowledge. New products
facilitates further inventions by raising the
technical level of the economy.
Negative ‘business stealing’ effects are
possible but are distinct from technological
externalities.
 scientific system
 higher education system
 firms and research laboratories
 the State
 financial intermediation system
 laws on patents and intellectual property
 improving the relationships between  science,
technology, higher education  and the firms
 promote the availability of ‘patient’ capital
 promote the availability of capital for risky
investments
 research and technology policy
knowledge and
ideas
Supposedly very strong. Linked to the
accumulation of knowledge and the ‘public
good’ aspect of new ideas. Inter-personal as
well as inter-temporal effects are possible
 networks (firms, scientific community)
 education and science systems
 international regime
 human mobility
 capital mobility
 education subsidies
 openness policies
 location policies
public
infrastructures
Positive external effects on private
productivity in general. Congestion effects
are possible too.
 the State
 local public authorities
 firms
 public investment programmes
 co-ordination between central and local
authorities
 taxes and subsidies
learning effects Strong inter-temporal externality, connected
to division of labour. The effects are
declining with time if applied to the same
technique
 firms’ mode of internal organisation
 education and training system
 wage-labour nexus
 labour force stability
 technical education of the labour force
 promote co-operation on the shop floor
 trade policy (specialisation in goods with different
learning potentials)
Source: extended and modified from Boyer and Didier [1998]
Table 2. Components of an institutional economic analysis
Definition Principle Factors of change
Constitutional
order
A set of rules governing
relationships between
individuals, organisations and
institutions
Legitimacy by deliberation
(in democratic societies)
Political process
Institution An intangible way of
structuring interactions
between organisations and
individuals
Reduces uncertainty
associated to opportunistic
behaviour. Favours
cooperation
Structural crises
Organisation A power structure and a set of
rules that organises the
actions of agents
Incentives and penalties
defined in reference to
external institutions and
conventions
Weak performance in
the competition with
other organisations
Convention A self-enforcing mechanism
of social coordination
The loss of the origins
makes it appear a ‘natural’
behaviour
Changes in the pattern
of interactions which
render the old
conventions ‘obsolete’
Habitus Pattern of individual
behaviour adopted during the
socialisation process
Adaptation to a certain
‘field’
Switch to another field;
New learning
Adapted from Boyer [1996].
Table 3. Institutional complementarity in various institutionalist
approaches.
Approach Main institutions & organisations concerned
Vintage Régulation
(M. Aglietta, R. Boyer, A. Lipietz, B. Coriat, J.
Mistral, P. Petit,…)
5 institutional forms:
- wage-labour nexus
- forms of competition
- State
- International regime
- Monetary regime
Social Structures of Accumulation
(S. Bowles, D. Gordon, T. Weisskopf,…)
- the capital-labour accord,
- the capital-citizen accord,
- the relationship of domestic capital to the
rest of the world
- the relationship between capitals (i.e., the
nature of inter-capitalist rivalry)
National systems of innovation
(B.A. Lundvall, R. Nelson, C. Freeman,…)
- almost all institutions that have an effect on
the accumulation of knowledge and skills
and innovation in the broad definitions
- science and technology institutions in the
narrow definition
- firms
Social Systems of production
(W. Streeck, R. Hollingsworth, C. Sabel,…)
Market is but one mode of coordination among
economic agents. There are markets, hierarchy,
communities, state, networks and associations.
Several elements are considered:
- the industrial relations system
- the training system
- the internal structure of corporate firms
- the structured relationships among firms in
the same industry or between suppliers and
customers
- the financial markets of a society
- the conceptions of fairness and justice held
by capital and labour
- the structure of the state and its policies
- a society’s idiosyncratic customs and
traditions as well as norms, moral
principles, rules, laws and recipes for action.
Varieties of capitalism
(D. Soskice,  P. Hall,…)
4 systems:
- financial system
- industrial relations system
- education and training system
- intercompany system
and several actors:
- firms
- business associations
- trade unions
- Central Bank
Comparative Institutional Analysis
(M. Aoki)
- Firms
- financial system
- labour  market
Social Systems of Innovation and Production
(B. Amable, R. Barré & R. Boyer)
6 sub-systems:
- science
- technology
- industry
- labour force
- education and training
- finance
Table 3 continued
Complementarity hierarchy
Expressed in the dynamics of the growth
regime and the mode of régulation, the latter
defined as a set of procedures and behaviours
(individual and collective) that serve to
reproduce fundamental social relations
through the combination of historically
determined forms, support and steer the
growth regime and ensure the compatibility of
a set of decentralised decisions
The wage-labour nexus is the driving institutional
form of the fordist regime, but this hierarchy
changes.
Expressed in the stability over time of the SSA
due to the coherence between its elements
Another element is its ability to diffuse to other
countries than the US
Dominance of the capital-labour accord to settle
class conflict
Takes place through interactions between
boundedly rational agents. The presence of
one institution may make learning easier and
hence the accumulation of knowledge.
Innovation is the source of growth and hence
dominates every other area of economic life one
way or another. Technology is the most
important (the only?) determinant of economic
evolution
All the different institutions and forms of
organisation  cohere together, but the different
elements vary in the degree in which they are
tightly coupled with each other onto a full-
fledged system. Hence a diversity of possible
systems.
Institutions do not act through incentives
alone, they shape modes of representation of
the world for agents.
Varies with history and the configuration of
institutions.
Central problems of the economy are
coordination problems. Institutions enhance
information flows among actors, provide
monitoring and facilitate credible
commitments,  communication and the
establishment of compromises over
distributional issues.
Interactions between the financial system
(corporate governance) and the labour market
(industrial relation) or between the Central
Bank and the mode of wage bargaining.
Observable with the structure of power and the
process of political decision-making. In Germany
for instance, domination of the bargaining
institutions (labour unions / firms). More
generally, the degree of organisation of business
conditions the variety of capitalism eventually
adopted, either coordinated or uncoordinated.
The features of the financial system and the
labour market define a set of incentives.
Complementarity is based on the joint effects
of these combined incentives. For instance,
the main-bank relationship characteristic of
Japanese industry defines a particular type of
management monitoring which reinforces the
work-incentives of the team-based work
organisation within Japanese firms
The financial system organisation and the
pattern of work organisation within firms
implicitly drive other components of the
economy.
The different sub-systems are characterised
by a certain mix of institutions and
organisations that are inherited from history
and partly transformed by political action and
purposeful agents.
Each sub-system is characterised a set of
possibilities and incentives for agents.
The compatibility of each sub-system with the
other defines ex-post the growth trajectories of
nations.
No a-priori hierarchy, which depends on the
historical period. The wage-labour nexus (labour-
force subsystem) in the fordist era; forms of
competition (industry and finance) in the current
period
Table 4. Four types of Social Systems of Innovation and Production
Market-based Meso-Corporatist European
integration /
Public
Social-democratic
General
principle
Market-based is the
dominant organising
principle and is  applied
to most institutions.
Principles of solidarity
and mobility within a
large size economic unit
(corporation) with
diversified production
Conciliation of the
objectives of Public
Authorities with
private sector
development, either
through negotiation
(Germany) or under
the control of the
State (France). A
regulated capitalism
Bargaining between
social partners for
rules that apply to the
economy and society
Implications for
Science Research system based
on competitions
between researchers
and between research
institutions
Important in-house
research largely
disconnected from the
academic world
Public basic research
disconnected from
new products
development
Importance of social
needs in the
definition of research
objectives
Technology Importance of
intellectual property
rights protection,
patents and copyrights
as incentives to and
protection of innovation
Importance of tacit
knowledge and  in-house
innovation
Importance of public
impetus for private
research
Gradual evolution
towards advanced
technologies and new
sectors: from natural
resources
exploitation to
information
technology
Competence
and skills
Highly segmented
labour force, innovation
and skills on one side,
low skills and
production on the other.
Homogenised general
education; specific skills
developed within the
corporation, but labour
market dualism
External rather than
internal mobility of
the labour force
Egalitarian ideals in
education and wage
setting. Limits to the
adverse
consequences of
technical progress
through public action
Labour
markets
Decentralisation of
wage bargaining,
individualised wage and
labour market
segmentation
Wage compromise within
the large corporation but
synchronising of wage
rises
Strong
institutionalisation of
employment rules,
working hours and
social protection
Centralisation of
wage bargaining
under the external
competitiveness
constraint
Competition Limits to concentration
by legal action;
constant evolution of
oligopolistic competition
Strong competition on
internal product markets
between large firms
Once moderate
competition because
of public intervention
or business
associations has
intensified within the
single market;
concentration of
capital
Small number of
large
internationalised
firms and networks of
small local suppliers
Finance Market-based finance
and sophistication of
financial services.
Financial innovation,
strong influence of
shareholders
Stable long-term
relationships between the
Main Bank and a
keiretsu. Strong
involvement of public
authorities (MOF and
Central bank) in private
banking
Importance of banks.
Relatively low
sophistication of
financial services
Bank-based financial
system, no
sophistication of
financial services
Products Important product
innovation
Adaptation of products
and processes in the
catching up phase, fast
product innovation after
Slow adaptation to
market changes
Importance of quality,
services and
differentiation
Market-based Meso-Corporatist European
integration /
Public
Social-democratic
Other characteristics
Public
Intervention
Fragmented in a series
of agencies and
monitoring institutions.
Strong limits to public
intervention, political
competition
Furnishes collective
services and acts as a
co-ordinator. Small size
but significant role
Important public
intervention (central
state or local
authorities): firms,
regulation, public
spending, social
security,…
Many forms of public
intervention with
financial transfers
and extensive
regulation
Importance of large
public research
programmes
(defence,…) which
supplements private
research
No large public programs
of the ‘mission’ type
Large variability
among the different
countries concerned
Largely open
economies
International
regime
Adherence to free trade
principles. Status and
autonomy of nations
depends on size (US vs.
UK,…)
Economic development
conditions all choices in
terms of international
trade
Regionalism (EU)
favoured over
multilateralism.
Political will for
european integration
conditions economic
integration
Small countries,
strong external
constraint
Consequences for
Innovation Schumpeterian waves
of  (radical) innovations.
Importance of patents
and individual rewards
to innovation
Ability to imitate, transfer
and transform technology
starting with incremental
innovation
Both ‘mission’-type
projects of large size
and incremental,
quality innovation
Innovation linked to
solutions to social or
economic problems
Industrial
specialisation
Sectors linked to
‘radical’ innovations:
information technology,
aerospace,
pharmaceuticals,
finance…
Sectors where
coordination is necessary
and where competence is
localised and cumulative
: automobile, electronics,
robotics
Sectors linked to
public infrastructures
(France,…) and/or
where competence
rests on a skilled
labour force:
aerospace,
mechanics,
automobile
Sectors linked to
social demand
(health, security,
environment) or
exploiting natural
resources
Table 5. The dynamics of SSIP
Market-based Meso-corporatist European integration
/ public
Social-democratic
Conditions
for possibility
of existence
- a sufficient level of
economic
development
- large
decentralisation of
research and
economic activities
- an efficient
generalist education
system
- existence of large
multi-product firms
- the intent to catch
up both
economically and
technologically
- acceptation and
legitimacy of a
variety of public
interventions
- acceptation of
the principles of
openness and
competitiveness
- values of
solidarity and
social justice
Strengths - specialisation in
codifiable
knowledge-based
activities
- rapid response to
structural change
- radical innovation
capabilities
- specialisation in
activities dominated
by localised
knowledge
- cumulativeness of
learning effects
- advantage in
incremental
innovation
- specialisation in
activities linked to
collective needs
(transport, health,
communication,…
)
- favours catching
up
- possibility to
switch to a
science-based
technological
paradigm
following Public
impulse
- specialisation in
local resource-
based activities
- low inequality
- pressure to
adoption of new
techniques in
high tech sectors
Weaknesses - underinvestment in
collective goods
- income inequality
- short termism and
instability from
financial markets
- underinvestment in
basic research
- slow reactions to
the the business
cycle
- Banking system
fragility
- underinvestment
in new industries
and slow product
innovation
- slow adaptation to
structural change
- high tax rates,
potentially a
dissuasion to
investment and
R&D
- inadequacy of
the financial
system to
modern
capitalism
Possible
destabilising
factors
- decrease in public
expenditures for
education and
research
- lack of co-
ordination in some
industries
- financial crisis
- difficulties in
adapting to a basic
science based
technological
paradigm
- Banking sector
crisis
- getting nearer the
technological
frontier calls for
new modes of
organisation
- constraints on
economic policy
hinder public
action
- diverging trends
compared to the
world economy
- destabilisation
through financial
liberalisation and
globalisation
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